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Try as it might, the Supreme Court seems unable to satisfy the crit-
ics of its approach to personal jurisdiction problems. Despite the Court's
repeated efforts over the past decade to clarify the due process con-
straints upon the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the states,1 each
decision brings only new criticism from the academy. Some commenta-
tors simply disagree with the substantive value judgments embodied in
the Court's approach. Others suggest that the Court is acting entirely
irrational.2 Those taking the latter position have nothing but contempt
for the existing doctrinal framework; these critics use phrases such as
"abstractions [decoupled from] any conceivable value,"'3 "incoherent by
* Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden); J.D., 1975, Harvard. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Lea Brilmayer, who read and commented upon a draft of this article.
1. Since 1977, the Supreme Court has decided eleven major personal jurisdiction cases: Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Heticopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (Helicol); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Campagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. See eg., McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-13 (1982) (criticizing Court's minimum contacts test as based on vague or
inadequate notions of state boundaries); Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of
Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 919 (1985) (discussing Court's separation of minimum contacts
concept from due process concerns of convenience and fairness to plaintiffs); Weintraub, Due Process
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 512
(1984) (correctly anticipating and criticizing Court's refusal in Helicol to extend general jurisdiction
based on defendant's "continuous and substantial" contacts with fornm state).
3. Weinberg, supra note 2, at 919.
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its own terms,"' 4 and inconsistent with "modem social realities' 5 to char-
acterize the Court's personal jurisdiction analysis.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of California 6 is sure to add fuel to the fire. Asahi not
only raises issues critical to the law of personal jurisdiction, but also adds
a twist: for the first time, the Court explicitly faced the question of
whether the assertion of specific jurisdiction7 over aliens was subject to a
different test than a similar assertion of specific jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent American citizens.8 If past experience is any guide, the Court's res-
olution of these issues should generate a flood of new scholarly criticism
of the judicial analysis.
This comment takes a somewhat different view. Rejecting the claim
that the Supreme Court's approach to personal jurisdiction cases is inco-
herent, I use Asahi as a paradigm to argue that the decisional pattern of
personal jurisdiction cases is the product of the interaction of a number
of perfectly understandable conceptions of fairness held by individual
Justices. This comment briefly outlines the state of personal jurisdiction
law prior to Asahi, 9 and then discusses the various opinions issued in
Asahi and explores the conceptions of fairness underlying the approaches
of different Justices. 10
I. PRIOR SUPREME COURT LAW
As virtually every law student knows, the modem law of personal
jurisdiction began with the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton. 11 International Shoe discarded the legal fiction of "presence" as the
test for asserting jurisdiction and established the rule that a state may
assert jurisdiction only over those defendants who "have certain mini-
mum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "12
The International Shoe test was elaborated and refined during the
Warren Court era, in decisions such as McGee v. International Life In-
4. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65
TEX. L. REV. 689, 734 (1987) (arguing that Court's purposeful availment rationale is incoherent and
"derived from a vision of sovereign authority that is too limited and too dependent on consent").
5. Weintraub, supra note 2, at 512.
6. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
7. See infra note 52.
8. 107 S. Ct. at 1031-34.
9. See infra notes 11-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-118 and accompanying text.
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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surance Co. 13 and Hanson v. Denckla. 14 In these decisions, the Court's
"minimum contacts" analysis increasingly focused on purposeful acts on
the part of the defendant that would justify the exercise of jurisdiction.
In McGee, for example, a unanimous Court found that the defendant's
sole contact with the forum state of California-the solicitation of a sin-
gle insurance policy from a California resident-was sufficient to satisfy
the due process requirement of International Shoe. '-
Hanson involved a law suit over the corpus of a trust established in
Delaware by a settlor who later became domiciled in Florida.
16
Although prior to her death the settlor had conducted substantial trust-
related business in Florida, 17 a closely divided Court nonetheless held
that the estate's trustee, a Delaware bank, lacked the requisite minimum
contacts that would have enabled Florida to exercise jurisdiction in the
dispute. 18 Neither the fact that the settlor and most of her beneficiaries
and appointees were domiciled in Florida nor the fact that the unilateral
exercise of the appointment power by the settlor occurred in the forum
sufficed to create jurisdiction over the trustee. Instead, the majority
ruled that for jurisdiction to lie "there [must] be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws."' 19
Hanson established that satisfaction of the minimum contacts test
will largely depend on the existence of some purposeful act or acts by the
defendant sufficient to create the expectation that his actions will bring
13. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
14. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
15. 355 U.S. at 222-23. Although the Court focused on the volitional nature of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state ("[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on
a contract which had substantial connection with that State"), the Court also noted the interests of
the forum state ("California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims") and the resident plaintiffs ("[w]hen claims were
small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a
foreign forum") in the minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 223.
16. 357 U.S. at 238.
17. Id. at 239. The settlor exercised her power of appointment as to the remainder of the trust
while a resident of Florida. Although these appointments significantly affected the distribution of
the settlor's trust, the Court held that this unilateral action did not suffice to "give Florida a substan-
tial connection with the contract on which this suit is based. It is the validity of the trust agreement,
not the appointment, that is at issue here." Id. at 253 (footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 251. The Court pointed out that the Delaware trustee did not solicit, conduct busi-
ness, or maintain offices in Florida. Unlike McGee, the cause of action did not arise out of any act
consummated in the forum state, but instead involved an agreement unconnected with Florida at the
time it was signed. Id. at 251-52.
19. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
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him within the forum state's jurisdiction.20 Significantly, the Hanson
majority rejected the dissenters' suggestion that the minimum contacts
test should focus on the interest of the forum state in the underlying
transaction, as well as principles of forum non conveniens and choice of
law.2 1 The state, concluded the majority, "does not acquire... jurisdic-
tion by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most con-
venient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not
choice of law."'22
In the post-Warren era, purposeful availment analysis has come to
dominate the Court's approach to personal jurisdiction problems. Prior
to Asahi, the parameters of the doctrine in the specific personal jurisdic-
tion context were largely defined by three cases: World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 23 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 24 and
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 25
In World- Wide Volkswagen, two New York residents brought a
products liability suit in Oklahoma state court against numerous defend-
ants, including a New York auto retailer who sold the plaintiffs an alleg-
edly defective car. The suit arose following an automobile collision on an
Oklahoma highway while plaintiffs were en route to their new home in
Arizona. 26
Plaintiffs based their jurisdictional argument on the theory of actual
foreseeability. 27 Because of the nature of the highly mobile product,
plaintiffs argued, the defendants should have foreseen the possibility that
it would be used in another state and cause injury there. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the relevant defendants had no other contacts with the
forum state,28 plaintiffs contended that the assumption of jurisdiction
was constitutionally permissible.29
Justice White, speaking for a six-member majority, rejected the
plaintiffs' actual foreseeability argument.30 He asserted that although
20. One commentator explains that the focus on the interests of defendants in personal jurisdic-
tion cases "rests on the advantages that a plaintiff typically enjoys in selecting among several forums
and on the proposition that, other things being equal, burdens that must rest on either the challenger
or the challenged are to be borne by him who seeks to change the status quo." Von Mehren, Adjudi-
catory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REv. 279, 321-22 (1983).
21. See 357 U.S. at 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 254:
23. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
24. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
25. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
26. 444 U.S. at 288.
27. Id. at 295.
28. Id. at 289.
29. Id. at 295.
30. Id. at 295-96.
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foreseeability is [not] wholly irrelevant . . . the foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a prod-
uct will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defend-
ant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
31
The Court contended that absent some "purposeful availment" by the
defendant corporation of the " 'privilege[s] of conducting activities
within the forum State,' "32 due process does not permit the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on the "unilat-
eral activity" of plaintiffs over which defendants exercise no control.
Finding a "total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a nec-
essary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction," Justice White
concluded that the minimum contacts requirement had not been met.
33
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 34 provides a useful counterpoint to
World- Wide Volkswagen. Keeton was a libel action brought in New
Hampshire against Hustler Magazine, an Ohio corporation. Hustler
Magazine's principal place of business was in California; its only connec-
tion with New Hampshire was that a small proportion of its magazines
(some of which contained the allegedly libelous statements) were sold in
that state. The plaintiff was a New York resident; her only connection
with the forum was that her name appeared on the masthead of several
magazines distributed in New Hampshire.35 The Court unanimously
held that the fourteenth amendment did not prevent the New Hampshire
courts from asserting jurisdiction over the defendant: "Where, as in this
case, [the defendant] has continuously and deliberately exploited the
New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine."
36
The Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiff was not a resident of New Hampshire; only a small portion of
the damages were suffered there; and the forum was almost certainly
chosen to take advantage of an unusually long statute of limitations.
31. Id. at 297. White noted a two-fold purpose behind the minimum contacts test: to protect
defendants and to ensure that states did not encroach on each other's sovereign interests. The latter
rationale was abandoned in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Carnpagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
32. 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
33. Id. at 295. See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (no personal jurisdiction
in domestic relations suit when father, by merely sending daughter to California to visit estranged
wife, neither showed intent to obtain or expectation to receive corresponding state benefit). See
generally Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior
Court, 65 VA. L. REv. 175, 181-83 (1979).
34. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
35. Id. at 772.
36. Id. at 781.
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Thus, once again, purposeful availment was clearly the central factor in
the Court's analysis.
The same theme dominated the Court's analysis in Burger King v.
Rudzewicz. 37 The defendant in Burger King, a Michigan resident, had
entered into a franchise agreement with a Florida corporation. The
agreement contemplated a continuing relationship between the parties
and required payments to be made in Miami, Florida. Throughout the
negotiations, however, the defendant had remained in Michigan; indeed,
he had never physically been in the state of Florida.38 Nonetheless, the
Court held that in a lawsuit over an alleged breach of the franchising
agreement, the Florida courts could constitutionally assert personal juris-
diction over the defendant.39 The majority held that
where the contacts [with the forum] proximately result from actions by
the defendant himself that create a "substantial connection" with the
forum State... he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by
"the benefits and protections" of the forum's laws it is presumptively
not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation
in that forum as well.4°
Taken together, World- Wide Volkswagen, Keeton and Burger King
clearly establish the primacy of the concept of purposeful availment in
personal jurisdiction analysis. In World- Wide Volkswagen, jurisdiction
was barred because the defendant's only contact with the forum state was
created by the "'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant.' "41 In contrast, when the defendants cre-
ated the relationship with the forum state-as in Keeton and Burger
King-the assertion of jurisdiction was held constitutional.42 While leav-
ing some cases at the margins unclear, these principles provide clear gui-
dance in most situations involving domestic defendants. None of the
three decisions, however, addressed the problem of jurisdiction over
aliens.
Several commentators have suggested that different standards
should be applied when dealing with alien defendants.43 Prior to Asahi,
37. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
38. Id. at 465-68, 476, 479.
39. Id. at 478.
40. Id. at 475-76 (emphasis in original).
41. 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
42. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80.
43. Professor Hay, for example, contends that states should be allowed to aggregate the con-
tacts of an alien defendant with the United States as a whole rather than being forced to rely only on
the contacts with the forum state itself. Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate
Defendants-Comments on Recent Care Law, 63 OR. L. REv. 431, 433-35 (1984). Thus, he would
allow the assertion of jurisdiction over aliens in situations in which an analogous domestic party
[Vol. 1987:669
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the Supreme Court never explicitly addressed the question.44 The issue
had, however, been potentially relevant in two earlier deeisions-Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 45 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol ).46
The defendant in Perkins was a corporation operating under Fili-
pino charter.47 While the Japanese occupied the Philippine Islands dur-
ing World War II, the corporation carried on "a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business" in the state of Ohio.
The Ohio activities of the corporation included directors' meetings, busi-
would plainly not be amenable to suit. Focusing on considerations of fairness to the plaintiff, Profes-
sor Weinberg would also allow more expansive jurisdiction over aliens in cases similar to Helicol.
Weinberg, supra note 2, at 931-34, 945-46. In contrast, Professors von Mehren and Trautman argue
that, because of the potentially greater difficulties in enforcing judgments outside the country, juris-
diction over aliens should face more stringent judicial scrutiny. See von Mehren & Trautman, Juris-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rlv. 1121, 1127-28 (1966). Finally,
Professor Gary Born takes a middle position, embracing the concept of national contacts but con-
tending that the reach of state court jurisdiction should be limited to avoid creating tensions in
foreign affairs. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. OF INT'L
AND COMp. L. 1, 27-44 (1987). See generally Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of Ameri-
can Law. A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer,
1987 (forthcoming) (suggesting that concerns of federalism should influence jurisdictional analysis in
international cases).
44. Before Asahi, lower courts were deeply divided over the appropriate personal jurisdiction
standard for aliens. See Born, supra note 43, at 6-10 (listing cases). Professor Born's review of the
pre-Asahi case law reveals a three-way split among the lower state and federal courts in state law
cases: while a majority of courts applied the identical standard to resolve personal jurisdiction chal-
lenges by foreigners and by United States citizens, a minority of courts required "closer contacts with
the forum state than would be necessary for jurisdiction over a United States defendant." Id. at 8
(emphasis in original). A minority of courts required "less close contacts with the forum State from
foreign defendants than from domestic persons." Id. (emphasis in original). Similarly, "[t]he treat-
ment of judicial jurisdiction by lower courts in federal question cases also is marked by confusion."
Id. at 9. While most courts "analyze questions of in personam jurisdiction over alien defendants by
examining the relationship of the defendant, the litigation and the forum under traditional Interna-
tional Shoe principles," Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
cited in Born, supra note 43, at 9, other courts adopt an "aggregate contacts" or "national contacts"
test that looks to "the aggregate presence of the defendants' apparatus in the United States as a
whole," Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973),
quoted in Born, supra note 43, at 10.
Asahi does not definitively resolve the divisions among the lower federal courts as to the appro-
priate personal jurisdiction standard for foreign defendants. In fact, the Court declines "to deter-
mine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national
contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court
sits." 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033 n.* (1987). Nonetheless, Asahi strongly suggests that, whenever "the
Federal interest in... foreign relations policies" is implicated by the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant, courts should proceed with greater care and caution in deciding whether to assert
jurisdiction, id. at 1035. See infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
45. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
46. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
47. 342 U.S. at 439.
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ness correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries and
purchasing of machinery for mining operations.48 The Supreme Court
held that the due process clause neither compelled nor prevented the
Ohio courts from asserting postwar jurisdiction over the corporation in
an action that did not relate to or arise out of its Ohio activities.49
Helicol involved a Texas tort action arising from a helicopter crash
in Peru. The defendant, Helicol, was a Colombian corporation that had
contracted to provide helicopter transportation for a Peruvian consor-
tium that in turn was the alter ego of a joint venture headquartered in
Houston. The defendant had sent its chief executive officer to Houston
to negotiate the transportation contract; accepted checks drawn on a
Texas bank; purchased helicopters, equipment and training sessions from
a Texas manufacturer and sent personnel to that manufacturer's facili-
ties for training. 50 The defendant had no other contacts with the forum
state. Treating the issue solely as one of general jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court held that the Texas courts had no jurisdiction over the
defendant. 51
Neither Perkins nor Helicol suggest that alien defendants, at least
for jurisdictional purposes, should be treated differently than American
citizens or corporations. Both cases, however, dealt only with issues of
general jurisdiction-jurisdiction based on claims unrelated to the de-
fendant's contact with the forum. 52 Neither addressed the standards to
be applied to assertions of specific jurisdiction-jurisdiction over actions
arising from or related to the defendant's connections to the forum state.
A defendant subject to general jurisdiction would in any event have sub-
stantial connections with the forum; under these circumstances the sig-
48. Id. at 438, 445.
49. Id. at 446, 448-49. The Court remanded the case to determine "whether, as a matter of
federal due process, the business done in Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently
substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign
corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in
Ohio." Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
50. 466 U.S. 408, 409-12 (1984).
51. Id. at 416, 418-19.
52. See id. at 414 nn.8-9; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446. A court has general jurisdiction over a
defendant if it would have jurisdiction over any claim against that defendant. The exercise of gen-
eral jurisdiction typically requires that the defendant have "continuous and systematic general busi-
ness contacts" with the forum state. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 416. An assertion of specific jurisdiction, in
contrast, rests only on the claim that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant in the single case
before it. Specific jurisdiction inevitably involves adjudication of a controversy directly relating to
the defendant's contact with the forun. Id. at n.8. This terminology was first employed in von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 43, at 1136, 1144-45.
The respondent's brief in the Helicol proceeding was somewhat cryptic, failing to distinguish
clearly between the two jurisdictional theories. The Court, however, chose to view the brief as based
only on a theory of general jurisdiction. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 415 & n. 10. Nevertheless, the Court
arguably should also have addressed the issue of specific jurisdiction.
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nificance of any potential distinction between aliens and American
citizens would be reduced. Thus, it is not surprising that it was in a
specific jurisdiction case-Asahi-that the defendant's alien status
emerged for the first time as an important factor in the Court's personal
jurisdiction analysis.5 3
II. ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO. V SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Asahi involved a products liability action arising from a motorcycle
accident in California. The cause of the accident was a rear tire blowout.
The rider of the motorcycle sued, among others, Cheng Shin Rubber In-
dustrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer that had produced the
motorcycle inner tube and made twenty percent of its total United States
sales in California.5 4 Cheng Shin in turn filed a cross-complaint seeking
indemnity from Asahi, the manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly.55
Asahi, a Japanese corporation, sold 1,350,000 valve assemblies to Cheng
Shin in the period from 1978 to 1982; in addition, Asahi valve assemblies
were incorporated into the tubes of numerous other manufacturers sell-
ing their product in California. 56 Asahi itself, however, had no offices,
property or agents in California and neither solicited business nor made
any direct sales in that state.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the due process clause
prevented California from asserting jurisdiction over Asahi.57 Eight Jus-
tices agreed that, regardless of whether Asahi had "purposefully availed"
itself of the benefits and burdens of doing business in the forum state,
"the facts of [the] case [did] not establish minimum contacts such that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction [would be] consistent with fair play
and substantial justice."58 The Court was deeply divided, however, on
the question of whether the Japanese manufacturer could be said 'to have
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California.
Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and
Scalia (the O'Connor Group) argued that Asahi's position was analogous
53. 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034-35 (1987).
54. Id. at 1029-30.
55. Id.
56. Although the Court's factual statement does not indicate what percentage of all Cheng Shin
tires sold in the United States contain Asahi valve assemblies, or whether Cheng Shin used only
Asahi valve assemblies, it does appear that Asahi's valve assembly sales to Cheng Shin constituted a
fairly minor portion of its total business: sales to Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi's
income in 1981, and 0.44 percent in 1982. Id. at 1030. It is not clear, however, what percentage of
Asahi's valve assembly business was directed at Cheng Shin.
57. Id. at 1033-35.
58. Id. at 1035. Justice Scalia apparently would have ended the inquiry once satisfied that
purposeful availment was not present.
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to that of the defendant in World- Wide Volkswagen. 59 The O'Connor
Group contended that "awareness that the stream of commerce may or
will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act
of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed
toward the forum State."' 0 Instead, "[the 'substantial connection'
between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant pur-
posefully directed toward the forum State. , 61 Because Cheng Shin, and
not Asahi itself, had made the choice to send Asahi's products to Califor-
nia, there was no purposeful availment and the assertion of jurisdiction
was unconstitutional. The O'Connor Group, however, did not address
the question of whether purposeful availment alone would always pro-
vide a sufficient predicate to subject a defendant to jurisdiction.
In contrast, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun (the
Brennan Group) argued that the purposeful availment requirement is
satisfied once a manufacturer inserts its product into the stream of com-
merce with knowledge that the product will eventually be used in the
forum state.6 2 Justice Stevens would have declined to reach the pur-
poseful availment issue; instead, he would have adopted an intermediate
approach, basing the constitutional analysis on "the volume, the value
and the hazardous character of the components" at issue.63 Stevens sug-
gested that "[ifn most circumstances" he would have found jurisdiction
59. Id. at 1031-33 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The O'Connor Group maintained that Asahi
should not be held accountable in a California state court for the consequences flowing from Cheng
Shin's unilateral act of introducing Asahi products.
60. Id. at 1033.
61. Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (emphasis in original)). Justice
O'Connor noted that Asahi's awareness that its valves may have been used in Cheng Shin tire tubes
sold in California would not be sufficient to satisfy her interpretation of purposeful availment. Be-
cause Asahi neither advertised, solicited business nor maintained agents or offices in California, and
because it was neither responsible for nor aware of the distribution system that brought its valves to
California, under O'Connor's view exercise of personal jurisdiction would exceed the limits of due
process, whether or not Asahi was aware of its products' ultimate destination. Id.
62. Id. at 1035-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Justice Brennan noted the distinction
drawn in World-Wide Volkswagen "'between a case involving goods which reach a distant State
through a chain of distribution and a case involving goods which reach the same State because a
consumer... took them there.'" Id. at 1037 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 306-07
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). He argued that Asahi's mere awareness that Cheng Shin's system
of distribution carried its valve assemblies into California sufficed to bring Asahi within World-Wide
Volkswagen's definition of purposeful availment. Id. at 1037-38.
63. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens was joined by two Justices
from the Brennan Group, Justices White and Blackmun. It is not clear whether Justices White and
Blackmun simultaneously adopted Stevens' intermediate approach, as well as the Brennan Group's
approach, to purposeful availment, or whether their concurrence with Justice Stevens was limited to
his point that the Court should have restricted its inquiry to the reasonableness of asserting jurisdic-
tion, rather than reaching the minimum contacts question.
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over a manufacturer such as Asahi constitutionally permissible.64
Because five members of the Court-Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and Stevens-appear to believe that Asahi purposely
availed itself of the benefits and burdens of doing business in California,
the decision not to grant the California courts jurisdiction over Asahi
turned on other factors. Of paramount importance in ascertaining these
factors is the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion supported by all the
Justices except Justice Scalia. In that part of her opinion, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the assertion of jurisdiction, regardless of one's
view of the purposeful availment issue, would offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice and therefore was unconstitutional. 65
The opinion recited the familiar litany of factors used by the Court in
earlier personal jurisdiction cases: "the burden on the defendant, the in-
terests of the forum state,... the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief,
... 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.' "66
In finding the assertion of jurisdiction improper, Justice O'Connor
relied heavily on two factors derived from the international scope of the
jurisdictional problem: "The unique burdens placed upon one who must
defend oneself in a foreign legal system" and the potential implications
for United States foreign policy.67 She also focused on the distance that
the defendant would be forced to travel to defend itself, and the fact that
the plaintiff's claim against Cheng Shin had been settled, leaving only the
indemnity issue to be adjudicated. 68 Justice O'Connor argued that be-
cause no California resident was a party to the cross-claim, the interest of
the state in the resolution of the claim was "slight," and thus insufficient
to justify the imposition of the "serious burdens" on Asahi.69 In short, in
Asahi, the Court for the first time since its adoption of the purposeful
availment analysis denied jurisdiction over a defendant that had purpose-
fully availed itself of the benefits and burdens of doing business in the
forum.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1033-35.
66. Id. at 1034 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
67. Id. at 1034-35.




III. THE LESSONS OF ASAHI
A. The Relevance of Minimum Contacts.
On a purely theoretical level, the treatment of the concept of mini-
mum contacts is one of Asahi's most significant developments. Until
quite recently, the Court consistently held that the existence of minimum
contacts is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the constitutional
assertion of jurisdictional authority.70 While the rhetoric of purposeful
availment had come to dominate modem opinions, that concept seemed
to be a simple gloss on the minimum contacts test itself.71 Thus, as late
as 1984, Justice Rehnquist was able to state confidently for a unanimous
Court in Calder v. Jones72 that "[t]he Due Process Clause ... permits
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any State with which the de-
fendant has 'certain minimum contacts... such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ",73
The first hint of a change in the role of minimum contacts came in
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Burger King. While noting that
"the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purpose-
fully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State," 74 he also stated
that "[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be consid-
ered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial
justice.' ",75 The precise import of this language was not entirely clear; it
seemed, however, to imply that in some circumstances the assumption of
jurisdiction would be unconstitutional even if the defendant had mini-
mum contacts with the forum state.76
70. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (assertion of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant must be predicated on minimum contacts between defendant
and state); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ("As has long been
settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant onl so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum
State.").
71. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) ("In judging minimum contacts, a court
properly focuses on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.' " (quoting
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977))).
72. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
73. Id. at 788 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
74. 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
75. Id. at 476 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
76. Justice Brennan seems to propose a two-part analysis: once purposeful availment by the
defendant is found, the Court must then inquire whether the presence of "other factors" is of suffi-
cient importance so as to render the assertion ofjurisdiction unreasonable. For example, a balancing
of the relative (and sometimes competing) interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, the forum state,
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Asahi confirms this interpretation. The opinion for the Court states
that "[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the interests
of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify
even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant," but that the
imposition of these burdens was not justified in Asahi 77 The clear impli-
cation is that assertion of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would have
been unconstitutional regardless of the existence of Asahi's contacts with
the forum state. Justice Brennan's concurrence highlights this point: he
would have denied jurisdiction despite his conclusion that "the facts
found by the California Supreme Court support its finding of minimum
contacts."'78 Asahi thus clearly establishes that the existence of minimum
contacts is a necessary but not sufficient condition to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements for personal jurisdiction. In all cases, the courts
must also test the facts against equitable notions of "fair play and sub-
stantial justice." The practical impact of this shift in emphasis is unclear;
both "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice" are suf-
ficiently vague to accommodate virtually any result. Nonetheless,
Asahi's change in the role of minimum contacts is an important theoreti-
cal development.
the interstate judicial system, and the "several States" may "sometimes serve to establish the reason-
ableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be re-
quired." On the other hand, a defendant who has purposefully engaged in forum activities may
nonetheless "defeat jurisdiction [by] present[ing] a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations... render[s] jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. While "such
considerations usually may be accommodated through means short of finding jurisdiction unconsti-
tutional"-i.e., through application of the forum's choice-of-law rules to reduce any potential con-
flict of "fundamental substantive social policies" between the forum's laws and those of another
state, or through a change of venue to reduce "substantial inconvenience" to the defendant-they
must ultimately be measured against the "minimum requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair
play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 477-78 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)). Without specifically describing the "minimum requirements" necessary for jurisdiction,
even when purposeful availment is found, Justice Brennan did note that "jurisdictional rules may not
be employed in such a way as to make litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party
unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent." Id. at 478 (quoting The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)); accord McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24. In sum,
Justice Brennan's two-part test suggests that the "rcasonableness" of "other factors" has a substan-
tial impact on the decision whether to assert jurisdiction once purposeful availment is established.
Prior to Asahi however, a majority of the Court had never found that, despite a defendant's pur-
poseful activity in the forum, jurisdiction nonetheless violated International Shoe's minimum re-
quirements of fair play and substantial justice.
77. 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1037 (Brennan, J., concurring). Despite his disagreement with the plurality's pur-
poseful availment analysis, Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]his is one of those rare cases in which
'minimum requirements inherent in the concept of "fair play and substantial justice" . . defeat the
reasonableness ofjurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activi-
ties.'" Id. at 1035 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78). See infra text accompanying note 80.
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B. The Future of Purposeful dvailment.
The failure of a majority of the Court to resolve the purposeful
availment issue was unprecedented in Burger Court due process jurispru-
dence. Asahl, however, does not presage the diminution of the impor-
tance of that concept in the Court's jurisdictional analysis. For the
O'Connor Group, purposeful availment remains a sine qua non for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction, even in situations where jurisdiction
would have been fair in all other respects. 79 Moreover, the Brennan
Group saw the case as a "rare" example of a situation in which pur-
poseful availment was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.80 Thus, pur-
poseful availment remains the most important element in almost all
personal jurisdiction cases; the question dividing the Court concerns
what constitutes purposeful availment.
The Court's various opinions clarify the views of the Justices on this
important issue, first raised but not resolved in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Justice White's majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen asserted
that "[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 81 The four mem-
bers of the O'Connor Group plainly expressed their disagreement with
this statement in Asahi;82 moreover, Justice Stevens indicated that he
would limit its application in some cases. 83 Thus, World-Wide Volks-
wagen's dictum cannot be said to express the views of the majority of the
Court.
The Justices' division over the purposeful availment issue contains
an important lesson for those seeking to decode the Court's approach to
personal jurisdiction questions. Typically, commentators have combed
majority opinions in personal jurisdiction cases for common themes that
can be labelled a unitary "doctrine of the Court. '8 4 A growing body of
commentary, however, suggests that this is an inappropriate method for
analyzing the course of decisionmaking by the Court. These commenta-
tors observe that Supreme Court decisions are the product of the interac-
tion of the approaches taken by nine separate decisionmakers.85 If one is
79. 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
80. Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
82. 107 S. Ct. at 1033. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
83. 107 S. Ct. at 1038.
84. For examples of such analysis, see generally Stein, supra note 4; Weintraub, supra note 2.
85. See, e.g., Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Unconstitutionality of Remedial Racial
Classifications: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IowA L. REv. 255, 271-74 (identifying posi-
tions of individual Justices on various aflirmative action issues); Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the
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to understand the pattern of results, one must study each of the nine
approaches rather than simply majority opinions.
The pattern of Court decisions from World-Wide Volkswagen to
Asahi illustrates this point. If one focused only on the unitary doctrine of
the Court, one would note only that the Asahi Court faced a question
that the World-Wide Volkswagen Court explicitly left open-whether
mere insertion of goods into the stream of commerce, with knowledge of
their ultimate destination (the forum state), satisfies the purposeful avail-
ment requirement-and that the resolution of the issue remained uncer-
tain even after the Asahi decision. 6 A more individualized analysis, on
the other hand, would begin by noting that there were three dissenting
Justices in World- Wide Volkswagen 87 and that each of these Justices
could be expected to oppose any further narrowing of purposeful avail-
ment. The views of these Justices would prevail in any case in which
they could attract two more votes either from members of the original
World-Wide Volkswagen majority or from newly appointed Justices who
had replaced members of that majority.
In fact, the World-Wide Volkswagen dissenters were able to attract
only one additional vote-that of World-Wide Volkswagen's author, Jus-
tice White. Justice Stevens, however, abandoned the World-Wide Volk-
swagen majority to stake out a middle position. The result is a Court
split three ways over the purposeful availment issue, with each position
reflecting a slightly different conception of fairness. All (with the possi-
ble exception of Justice Brelman 88) agree on one basic premise-that it is
fundamentally unfair to require a person to defend himself before the
courts of a sovereign with which he has not voluntarily associated him-
self. They differ, however, on the degree to which a defendant may be
charged with complicity in the actions of others.
The view of the O'Connor Group rests on a highly individualistic
vision; members of this group would charge a party with responsibility
only for those actions taken by the party itself. Anything less than con-
duct purposefully directed at the forum state by the defendant-including
Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 802-03 (1982) (arguing that fragmented opinions are inevitable result
of certain structural features of Court's decisionmaking process); Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking
the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 82-83 (1986) (emphasizing importance of interaction among individual
Justices in forming a comprehensive theory of adjudieation); Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of
the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 357, 369 (1982) (suggesting that "a deeper under-
standing of the workings of the Court [requires study of] the viewpoints of the individual Justices
rather than simply the consensus... generated by the interaction among these viewpoints").
86. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
87. See 444 U.S. at 299-313 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 313-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id.
at 317-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 306-07 & nn.11-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (jurisdictiou permissible where fore-
seeable that customer would bring product into distant state). See also infra notes 93-94.
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the mere insertion of its product into the stream of commerce-will not
satisfy their definition of purposeful availment. 89 Members of the Bren-
nan Group are less united in their approach. Justice White split from the
other members of the group in both World- Wide Volkswagen and Burger
King, 90 writing the majority opinion in the former and dissenting in the
latter. For him the key difference apparently was that Asahi knowingly
had placed its product in the stream of commerce via a system of distri-
bution (albeit one not created by Asahi itself) intended to deposit the
goods in the forum state, while the defendant in World- Wide Volkswagen
had merely sold its product to an ultimate consumer whose unilateral
activity brought the goods into the forum state.91
Justice Brennan has pursued his own personal jurisdiction analysis,
filing separate opinions joined by no other Justice in five of the eleven
personal jurisdiction cases decided in the past decade.92 He would ex-
tend broadly the reach of state power in personal jurisdiction cases, fo-
cusing on actual inconvenience to defendants and "commercial
reality."'93 Indeed, for Justice Brennan, the question of whether goods
reach a distant state via a chain of distribution, or by some unilateral act
of the customer, is "without constitutional significance, because in [his]
view the foreseeabiity that a customer would use a product in a distant
State [is] a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. ' 94 In contrast, in World- Wide
Volkswagen Justices Marshall and Blackmun seemed to accept the basic
89. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033 (1987). See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
90. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287-99 (White, J.); Burger King, 471 U.S. 462,
487 (1985) (White, J., joining Stevens, J., dissenting) ("significant element of unfairness in requiring
franchisee to defend a case" in forum where franchisee did no business and had no reason to believe
he would be amenable to suit).
91. See 444 U.S. at 297, 298 (White, J.).
92. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419-28 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of confusing ideas of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdic-
tion and unduly narrowing reach of general jurisdiction); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (downplaying importance of forum state's
interests in enforcing its substantive laws and its statute of limitations); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320, 333 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (incorporating own World-Wide Volkswagen dissent by
reference); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-300 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (blaming Savchuk and World-Wide Volkswagen majorities for "focus[ing] tightly on the
existence of contacts between the forum and the defendant [and]... accord[ing] too little weight to
the strength of the forum State's interest in the case and fail[ing] to explore whether there would be
any actual inconvenience to the defendant"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219-28 (1977) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (decrying majority's "advisory opinion" on the
constitutionality of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction under minimum contacts standard, and disagreeing
with majority's conclusion).
93. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299-313 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
94. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1037 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 306-07 & nn.11-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Although Justice Brennan's definition of"fore-
seeability," for purposes of defining purposeful availment, is broader than that expressed by any of
his fellow Justices, he would not extend it to "cases involving 'one, isolated occurrence [of consumer
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methodology of the majority, but differed in its application to the case
before the Court.95 Although both Justices argued that the reasonable-
ness of foreseeing an automobile manufacturer's or distributor's amena-
bility to suit was a function of the product itself, they both seem to share
Justice Brennan's view that for the purposes of determining foreseeability
of being haled into a distant forum, it does not matter whet-her the prod-
uct entered the stream of commerce via a customer's unilateral act or
through a distributor's or manufacturer's system of distribution.
96 All
members of the Brennan Group, however, see defendants in Asahi-type
cases as links in a chain to which they have voluntarily attached them-
selves.97 As such, defendants may be charged not only with their own
actions, but also with the actions of others in the chain.
Given the present division in Asahi-type cases, the balance of power
is held by Justice Stevens. His approach-based on the magnitude of the
defendant's penetration of the forum market as measured by "the vol-
ume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components" 9 8-is
not prefigured by the majority opinions in earlier personal jurisdiction
cases. Instead, it probably reflects Stevens' idiosyncratic emphasis on the
importance of ensuring that the defendant be subject to jurisdiction only
where he can be deemed to have had fair notice that he would be subject
to suit in the forum. This theme dominated Stevens' separate opinions in
both Burger King and Shaffer v. Heitner. 99
In short, notwithstanding the lack of a majority opinion on the pur-
poseful availment issue, close analysis of the various opinions yields con-
siderable insight into the principles of fairness that generate the Court's
approach to this problem.
C. The Significance of Alienage.
As discussed above, 1°° the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion
use, amounting to] ... the fortuitous circumstance.'" 107 S. Ct. at 1037 n.3 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295).
95. 444 U.S. at 313-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding Court's definition of foreseeability too
narrow); id. at 317-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (nature of instrumentality makes expectation of suit
in distant state reasonable).
96. Id. at 315 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree that jurisdiction is necessarily lacking
if the product enters the State not through the channels of distribution but hi the course of its
intended use by the cunsumer.'); id. at 318-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]n assessing 'minimum
contacts,' foreseeable use in another State seems to me to be little different from foreseeable resale in
another State.").
97. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1038.
98. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 487-90 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186,
217-19 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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joined by seven other Justices employs two types of arguments. One type
of argument ("domestic arguments") applies to all personal jurisdiction
cases. The other type of argument ("international arguments") is limited
to questions of jurisdiction over aliens. One of the central questions in
Asahi is whether the international arguments were critical to the decision
of the Court.
1. Domestic Arguments. If only domestic arguments were con-
sidered, reconciling Asahi with prior case law would pose substantial
problems. The Court's focus on the fact that no California resident re-
mained a party to the case1 01 is particularly troubling, given its seeming
inconsistency with Keeton. As in Asahi, the defendant in Keeton con-
tended that the plaintiff's uonresident status in the forum state under-
mined the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, and therefore
should have militated against the assertion of jurisdiction. Speaking for
eight members of the Court in Keeton, Justice Rehnquist firmly rejected
this contention. While conceding that the interest of the state might be
relevant in some circumstances, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
we have not to date required a plaintiff to have "minimum contacts"
with the forum State before permitting that State to assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant....
But plaintiff's residence in the forum State is not a separate re-
quirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established
on the basis of defendant's contacts.10 2
This argument implicitly suggests that state interests should be of limited
importance in personal jurisdiction analysis. 10 3
The Asahi Court took a different view. While the action in Keeton
clearly derived from "the very activity being conducted, in part, in [the
forum state," 1 4 Justice O'Connor noted in Asahi that "[Ihe transaction
on which the indemnification claim is based took place in Taiwan [be-
cause] Asahi's components were shipped from Japan to Taiwan."105 She
concluded that California had little interest in adjudicating the
controversy. 10 6
This contention seems based upon an unduly limited characteriza-
tion of the situation. Admittedly, the defendant could not have been lia-
ble if it had not shipped the parts; one could equally well say, however,
101. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
102. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984).
103, Keeton also suggests that once a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state have
been established, all other concerns-including the interests of the forum in the outcome of the
case-are of secondary importance. See supra text following note 36.
104, 465 U.S. at 780.




that Asahi would not have been liable if there had been no accident-an
occurrence that took place in the forum state. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, California's connection with the action seems much more
substantial.
The problem is exacerbated by the Court's reliance on the fact that
the original dispute between Cheng Shin and the motorcycle driver had
been settled-a circumstance which the Court argued deprived Califor-
nia of its primary contact with and interest in the case.107 This emphasis
seems flatly inconsistent with Keeton and other recent case law in which
the focus has been on fairness to the defendant. 108 Asahi simply does not
care whether a California plaintiff is or is not a party to the case; the
substantive character of its defenses and the inconvenience of defending
in California are unaffected by the settlement. By focusing on the lack of
state interest, the Court seems to be returning to the personal jurisdiction
analysis used in pre-World-Wide Volkswagen cases, such as Kulko v. Su-
perior Court of California 10 9 and Shaffer v. Heitner. 110
These seeming inconsistencies with prior case law might be ex-
plained by asserting that some Justices had changed their positions on
the relevant criteria for determining personal jurisdiction. If one were
dealing with changes in the votes of one or two Justices, such an explana-
tion might be plausible. It is less probable when, as in Asahi and Keeton,
seven Justices joined seemingly inconsistent opinions.111 In such a case,
it seems likely that other factors explain the result. The distinguishing
factor in Asahi was that the defendant was an alien, rather than a citizen
of the United States. In assessing the opinion of the Court, the interna-
tional factors thus provide the most appropriate focus for analysis.
2. International Arguments. Limiting the significance of Asahi to
the special problems raised by the assertion of jurisdiction over aliens
avoids direct conflict with established principles of due process analysis.
At the same time, however, such an approach writes a new chapter in the
stormy relationship between the concept of federalism and the analysis of
jurisdictional problems. The possibility that federalism concerns may be
a factor in the personal jurisdiction calculus was first suggested in Justice
White's majority opinion in World- Wide Volkswagen:
[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant
for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the
107. Id.
108. See, ag., Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-81.
109. 436 U.S. 84, 98-101 (1978).
110. 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977).
111. Chief (then Associate) Justice Rehnquist, Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Ste-
vens and O'Connor voted together in Keeton and in the relevant portion of AsahL
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principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution....
[T]he Framers... intended that the States retain many essential attri-
butes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to
try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, im-
plied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limita-
tion express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment....
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconven-
ience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render
a valid judgment.1 12
This language generated a flurry of scholarly criticism. 113 Much of
the criticism pointed out that a personal jurisdiction analysis relying on
the concept of states' rights was inconsistent with the notion that defend-
ants could waive their objections to personal jurisdiction. For while pri-
vate defendants should be in a position to waive their own rights, they
should hardly be given the power to forfeit the sovereign prerogatives of
state governments. Thus, if considerations of federalism were in fact at
the core of the fourteenth amendment limitations on jurisdiction, all such
limitations should be treated as nonwaivable constraints on subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. A majority of the Justices soon recognized this problem;
in Insurance Corporation of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 114 the Court abandoned the notion that considerations of feder-
alism were central to personal jurisdiction analysis.
Asahi implicitly confirms the demise of the federalism analysis used
in World- Wide Volkswagen. Obviously, states are under no constitu-
tional obligation to preserve the sovereign status of foreign nations;
therefore, the considerations of federalism raised in World-Wide Volk-
swagen are irrelevant to the relationship between a state and a foreign
citizen. Thus, if federalism-based concerns were an important part of the
112. 444 U.S. at 293-94 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254 (1958)).
113. See, eg., Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evalua-
tion, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 1120 (1981) ("The terms of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause refer to the rights of 'persons,' not states .... Yet, without any supporting reference to the
language, policy, or history of the fourteenth amendment or to the general concept of due process,
the Supreme Court has consistently appended considerations of federalism to its due process analysis
of personal jurisdiction."); Weinberg, supra note 2, at 924 ("State sovereignty seems a priori to have
nothing to do with due process and is not mentioned in the due process clause.").
114. 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982) (restriction on state sovereign power "ultimately a func-
tion of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause" rather than a function of
federalism concerns); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); Burger
King, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985).
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justification for jurisdictional limitations, one would expect that aliens
would receive less protection from the due process clause. Asahi is
clearly inconsistent with this conclusion.
Indeed, Asahi suggests that considerations of federalism play an en-
tirely different role than that suggested by World-Wide Volkswagen;
rather than contributing to constraints on a state's authority to exercise
personal jurisdiction, such considerations actually reduce these con-
straints in some circumstances. In this context the reference to values of
federalism is not, as suggested by World- Wide Volkswagen, related to the
preservation of state sovereignty. Instead, Justice O'Connor's analysis
reflects two other types of federalism-related concerns.
First, Justice O'Connor's reference to potential problems of foreign
relations generally implicates vertical federalism-the interaction be-
tween the national government and the state governments. 115 She cor-
rectly observed that the federal government is charged with regulating
relationships with foreigu nations, and that excessive assertions of juris-
diction by states can create tensions between these nations and the
United States, thereby making the federal task of managing these rela-
tionships more difficult. By limiting state court jurisdiction over foreign
citizens, the possibility of creating tensions is thereby limited.116
In less obvious ways, the opinion of the Court also implicates the
concept of horizontal federalism-the principles that govern the relation-
ship among the different states of the union. Admittedly, only one
state-California-is involved in Asahi. But by focusing on "special"
burdens imposed on foreign defendants,117 the Court implicitly suggests
that horizontal federalism has an influence on the outcome of domestic
jurisdictional challenges. In the absence of the federal structure created
by the Constitution, a defendant from state A could claim that he was
subject to the same burdens as a foreigu citizen if he was summoned to
defend a suit in state B. Within this strncture, however, a citizen of one
state is not entitled to consider the system of another state "foreign" in
the same sense that he might use that term to describe the system of
another nation. Thus, because of the nature of federalism, a domestic
defendant is more likely than a foreigu defendant to be subject to suit in a
state that is not his home.
This argument relates to the most basic theme of personal jurisdic-
tion analysis. The fundamental question in the jurisdiction cases has al-
ways been whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum
115. 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
116. Born, supra note 43, at 27-34.
117. 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
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to render the assertion of jurisdiction "fair." 118 A citizen of state A is
already indirectly connected to state B through the structure of the fed-
eral system; in contrast, a citizen of a foreign country has no such auto-
matic connection. Therefore, as Asahi suggests, a greater volume of
additional connections is required to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
over the citizen of a foreign nation. In short, federalism-related values
become elements in the calculus of fairness to the defendant which deter-
mines the outcome of challenges to state assertions of personal
jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Asahi does not presage a major change in the direction of the juris-
prudence of personal jurisdiction. Admittedly, the discussions of mini-
mum contacts, purposeful availment and the significance of American
citizenship are important theoretically; in practice, however, they shed
new light only on marginal cases. Thus, any changes in doctrine gener-
ated by the case are best viewed as incremental rather than seminal.
The primary message which emerges from Asahi is that in close
cases personal jurisdiction decisions will often defy easy characterization.
Such decisions are likely to reflect a complex interaction among a variety
of different values rather than the straightforward application of a small
number of principles. Two factors explain this phenomenon. First, the
majorities in such cases may be coalitions of Justices with varying ap-
proaches to personal jurisdiction analysis. Second, the individual views
of each Justice may very well reflect the influence of a variety of different
factors.
Admittedly, this complexity makes the construction of academic
models which fully explain the pattern of decisions somewhat difficult.
The task is made even more difficult by changes in the make-up of the
Court that can be decisive in close cases.119 Given this complexity, it is
easy to characterize the actions of the Court as totally irrational or inter-
nally inconsistent. But complexity is not irrationality; indeed, commen-
tators fail in one of their primary missions if they do not take the time
and effort necessary to understand fully judicial decisions and the values
which underlie them. For only after accurately identifying the values
118. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945).
119. Newly appointed Justice Anthony Kennedy has yet to rule on a personal jurisdiction case
as a member of the Supreme Court. As an appellate judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, then-Judge Kennedy in at least one instance joined the opinion of a three-judge
panel that followed a restrictive definition of purposeful availment. See Pacific Trading Co. v. M/V
Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325 (1985) (Nelson, J). It is remains to be seen whether Kennedy will take
a similar position on the Supreme Court.
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which inform the Court's approach to personal jurisdiction analysis can
one devise a truly effective critique of that approach. As the foregoing
analysis of Asahi demonstrates, the task of the commentators in this re-
gard is difficult, but not impossible.
